Dan Rather Calls For Independent Investigation of Sessions Russian Involvement

By Dan Rather
March 2, 2017

Every once in a while in Washington, the fuse is lit for what seems to be a big scandal. Much more rarely does that fuse lead to an explosion of the magnitude we are seeing with Russia and the new Administration, and frankly the Republicans in Congress. How can anybody say, with all this billowing smoke and sights of actual flames, that there is no need to at least independently investigate whether a fire is burning down the very pillars of our democracy?

The pressure is obviously starting to mount as leading Republicans are now calling for Attorney General Jeff Sessions to recuse himself from the Russia investigation. This comes in the wake of serious and credible evidence reported by a vigilant press that the Attorney General, mind you the top law enforcement man in the United States, perjured himself in testimony to the Senate about meeting the Russian ambassador during the election. Sessions is but the latest person close to President Trump who seems to be ensnared in a story that is more worthy of Hollywood melodrama than the reality of the governance of our country. Democrats are calling for Sessions to resign, and this story could move very quickly.

We are well past the time for any political niceties or benefits of the doubt. We need an independent and thorough investigation of Russia’s meddling in our democracy and its ties to the President and his allies. We don’t know what we don’t know. Perhaps there are perfectly innocuous reasons for why Mr Trump won’t release his tax returns, why he has continued to speak admirably about President Putin and why his aides and advisors seem to be so close to Russia. That’s why we need an investigation. If the air is to be cleared, it needs to be cleared. And if there is deep rot, it needs to be exposed. And quickly.

The press is doing an admirable job. But there is only so much it can do without such things as subpoena powers. Let’s just make this clear. This is about a foreign and hostile power trying to influence our election while being in contact with close aides to the presidential campaign that the Kremlin wanted to win. Furthermore, there are serious questions about Mr Trump’s longstanding ties to Russian money and influence peddlers. We don’t know where this might go, but it isn’t going away.



February 14, 2017

Washington, D.C. ­– U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, released the following statement on the resignation of National Security Advisor Michael Flynn:

“I thank General Flynn for his many years of distinguished service to our country, especially his invaluable contributions in the fight against terrorism. I wish him the very best in his future endeavors.

“At the same time, General Flynn’s resignation is a troubling indication of the dysfunction of the current national security apparatus. As our nation confronts the most complex and diverse array of global challenges since the end of World War II, it is imperative that the President select a new National Security Advisor who is empowered by clear lines of authority and responsibility and possesses the skills and experience necessary to organize the national security system across our government.

“General Flynn’s resignation also raises further questions about the Trump administration’s intentions toward Vladimir Putin’s Russia, including statements by the President suggesting moral equivalence between the United States and Russia despite its invasion of Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, threats to our NATO allies, and attempted interference in American elections. American policy toward Russia must be made clear and unequivocal: we will honor our commitments to our NATO allies, we will maintain and enhance our deterrent posture in Europe, we will hold Russian violators of human rights accountable for their actions, and we will maintain sanctions on Russia so long as it continues to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

“As Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I look forward to working with the President’s administration, especially Secretary Mattis, to defend the nation and support our military service members.”

Trump Mulls Another ‘Peregruzka’ with Russia

As Trump mulls another ‘peregruzka’ with Russia, he should consider perils of Big Oil diplomacy

Amy Myers Jaffe, University of California, Davis

Energy has long been used as a tool of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. But it’s true in other regions and countries as well, most notably Russia, where President Donald Trump is pondering another possible “reset” in relations.

This will be the fourth such attempt at a relationship reboot with Moscow since the disintegration of the Soviet Union began in 1989. And each time – in 1993, 2002 and 2009 – renewed investment by the U.S. oil and gas industry played a role in trying to improve ties. And each effort failed for a variety of reasons.

With the U.S. relationship with Russia once again high on the White House agenda amid Russian overtures and intensive attention to the ins and outs of Russian hacking, it’s worth taking a closer look at these past roles the U.S. energy industry has played in efforts to pursue warmer ties with Russia. Trump would be wise to heed this history, especially since oil always looms large in the bilateral relationship.

Oil and American diplomacy

The U.S. oil and gas industry is widely considered one of the most technologically advanced in the world, having pioneered fracking techniques as well as other advanced technologies needed to drill in Russia’s harsh Arctic terrains and to liquefy natural gas for easy shipment.

And for decades, the U.S. has sponsored trade missions that use oil and gas investment as a way to persuade other countries to adhere to American interests. Examples include disarmament in Kazakhstan and Libya, conflict resolution in the Middle East and Latin America and nuclear nonproliferation and the fight against terrorism in the former Soviet Union and West and East Africa.

On the flip side, denial of access to American know-how has been wielded as a stick against countries that defy the U.S.-led international order: for example, by sponsoring terrorism (Iran and Libya) or invading neighboring countries (Russia).

Post-Cold War euphoria turns sour

The opening of Russia’s oil industry to American companies began shortly after the collapse of the USSR. A 1993 summit between leaders of both countries led to the creation of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission to promote Russo-American economic and technological cooperation, including in energy.

The United States, in essence, was offering up its companies to assist Russia in revitalizing its energy industry. ConocoPhillips was an early adopter with its Polar Lights project, which began in 1994 amid the euphoria of U.S.-Russia collaboration. But the company soon became a victim of Russian bureaucratic hassles that hampered its ability to export oil.

Other U.S. companies that followed suffered similar fates as that early optimism was met with myriad legal, regulatory and logistical difficulties that eventually turned profits into losses in some cases.

Such failures mirrored the difficulties on other policy fronts that eventually beset the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal and subsequent U.S. arms control initiatives as the Kremlin failed to honor both the letter and spirit of agreements.

While this experience clearly illustrates the dangers of being lured by unfulfillable promises and misplaced optimism when it comes to Russia, the U.S. had a hard time learning this lesson.

Putin, 9/11 and a new hope

In the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attack, the U.S.-Russian energy dialogue again gained momentum after newly elected Russian President Vladimir Putin let it be known that Moscow was willing and able to help diversify global energy supplies away from the troubled Middle East to help the U.S.

It was in this context that several U.S. oil companies, including ExxonMobil, expanded their exploration and production deals in Russia. In May 2002, President George W. Bush and Putin initiated a new high-level dialogue that led to an energy summit in Houston, Texas, in October and new oil and gas investment deals.

But all was not smooth sailing despite what seemed to be initially an auspicious geopolitical backdrop. No sooner had billions of dollars been committed and oil started to flow than Putin initiated a change of political course in 2005 that defined Russian national security as better served by renationalizing the oil and gas industry.

And so U.S. oil companies experienced similar reneging and renegotiations, as well as threatening tactics directed from the Kremlin, which in some cases included outright arrests of partners and the taking of assets.

The Kremlin used a variety of means to “convince” its foreign partners to turn over assets to favored firms whose leaders were positioned inside Putin’s inner circle. Disputes over back taxes and other kinds of trumped-up environmental or criminal charges were used to justify the retaking of assets. Approvals for access to export pipelines were often linked unofficially to selling stakes back to Russian entities.

The pressures on oil industry executives trying to do business in Russia was so intense at least one American-born senior executive of a major multinational company was forced into hiding. In another example, in 2004 the Russian government effectively annulled a tender award ExxonMobil had won in 1993 for exploration rights in the Russian Arctic region of the Sakhalin Islands and requested over a billion dollars for a new license to operate there.

Obama’s reset goes wrong

Perhaps the most famous effort at a reset with Russia came in 2009 shortly after President Obama took office, when then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave her Russian counterpart an actual red button with the word “reset” written on it.

While the Obama administration did not explicitly make energy cooperation a diplomatic carrot, the effort did improve the situation for a few American oil firms like Chevron and ExxonMobil – at least temporarily – as Russian interest in developing technically challenging Arctic oil and gas resources increased.

As we all know, the Obama reset ran aground as other geopolitical disagreements, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and its military intervention in Syria’s civil war, overshadowed the relationship. The U.S. and Europe placed sanctions on Russia in 2014, creating losses anew for U.S. oil companies.

In the end, most American companies such as ConocoPhillips and Marathon Oil have chosen to sell their holdings in Russia and exit completely in recent years. Others, like ExxonMobil, have reduced risk by participating in international consortia involving important Russian and international firms.

ExxonMobil, for example, eventually secured its multi-billion dollar deal in the Sakhalin Islands by partnering with Russian oil giant Rosneft and several other foreign firms. Still, the venture has faced many obstacles, including tax disputes and logistical problems.

Lessons for the U.S.

There is no question that this history of triumphs and failures offers important lessons for the oil industry and the Trump administration.

In all three efforts, American diplomats and oil executives alike focused on discussions about long term win-wins, while the Russians goals were more limited and short-term.

The first lesson is that Moscow can be quick to offer an accommodating posture when it needs something, such as money or advanced technology, but that this is not necessarily reflective of a permanent change in vision. One savvy American oil company chairman once confided to me that the CEO of his Russian counterpart in a joint venture spent nearly all of his workday canvassing the halls of the Kremlin to intercept early changes in policy or internal political power shifts.

Right now, for example, Russia desperately needs the sanctions on its economy removed. The history suggests Trump probably shouldn’t offer any relief until Russia has brought substantial concessions to the table on issues such as nuclear weapons, cooperation on ISIS and Syria, and ongoing hacking threats.

Secondly, a position of strength will facilitate a deal faster than an accommodative posture or natural alignment, as Rex Tillerson, the newly confirmed secretary of state and former chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, knows from first-hand experience. Oil companies that approached Russian leaders with talk of technology transfer and technical expertise were not necessarily those that excelled against the political winds in Moscow. Rather, companies posing a strong competitive market challenge to Russian counterparts such as Rosneft fared better than the rank and file, many of whom have been forced to abandon Russian assets over the years.

ExxonMobil is an example of the success of this strategy. After lengthy negotiations with Rosneft seemed to be getting nowhere, ExxonMobil mounted an assertive campaign to challenge that company in key markets such as Eastern Europe, Germany and China by offering its customers competitively priced, alternative supplies. The tenor of the talks with Russia improved after that, leading to an expanded strategic agreement (read truce) in 2013.

The Russian wolf

As the Kremlin tries to woo yet another incoming U.S. administration, Moscow expects to count on what it considers the “greed” of Big Oil to help it end the sanctions strangling its economy and to attract fresh investment in its energy industry.

But perhaps this time around, the U.S. government and the Western oil industry will more accurately view Russia as a wolf in sheep’s clothing and greet the overture prepared with its own gun in hand: U.S. shale exports, which provide competition for Russian oil and help prevent diplomatic strong-arming.

The new administration has already positioned itself to use this lever, perhaps evidence that Trump could be the negotiator-in-chief he has promised to be.

The Conversation

Amy Myers Jaffe, Executive Director for Energy and Sustainability, University of California, Davis

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

We Deeply Regret to Inform You That Donald Trump Will be The 45th President of the United States of America – An Opinion


January 12, 2017
By Herb Ryan

Yesterday, January 11, 2017,  the President-elect blundered through a press conference at his palace in New York. This was his first press conference, actually one long vocal tweet, since July of 2015. Trumps “folie de grandeur” only added to the conviction of many that the nightmare is all to real. Just imagine if you will, his Inaugural Speech on January 20, eight days from today. Hopefully, he will be able to complete the swearing-in ceremony without adding any derisive remarks. The real entertainment, because this is nothing but a reality show, starts when he goes off script. His ego will never let him read the teleprompter for more than three minutes. Then all hell should break loose.

Henny Youngman, bless his soul was the king of one liners. But, Youngman was a professional entertainer and knew where the line was drawn and made every effort not to cross it. Trump, unlike Youngman, has no sense of humor, and there is no line his megalomania will not cross. Sound familiar, perhaps The Ride of the Valkyries, German Beer Halls and 1939 may stir comparisons in your mind.

Opening remarks by incoming director of propaganda Sean Spicer referenced the previous nights news reports about Russia’s attempt to influence Trumps election calling CNN and Buzzfeed  for their reports “sad and pathetic attempt to get clicks,” and referred to the former as a “left wing blog that was openly hostile to the president-elect’s campaign.” Spicer continued “It was highly irresponsible of them to drop highly salacious, and flat-out false information on the internet just days before the president-elect takes the oath of office.”

Highly salacious? How about the October 28 “Comey Effect” letter sent to the House Judiciary Committee announcing new Clinton emails and his subsequent letter on November 6 that absolved Clinton (after millions of votes had already been cast early).

In his opening remarks, Trump whined about being picked on by the mainstream press, and then thanked the news organizations that published articles he approved of, “There were some news organizations that were so professional, and I’ve just gone up a notch as to what I think of you.” He also bashed the intelligence agencies for releasing the info. “This is going to be a tremendous blot on their record.”

Other well thought out one-liners by Trump:

He talked about how pharma “gets away with murder,” and wants to see more bidding for drugs. “We don’t bid properly, and we will save billions of dollars by doing so,” said Trump.

Trump announced that he has named David J. Shulkin his VA secretary, and before taking the first question, he said: “I will be the greatest jobs producer that God ever created.”

John Roberts of Fox News, who asked the pres.-elect whether or not he had received the notorious two-page summary, and if he believes Putin ordered hacks of the DNC and RNC. “If so, how will that impact your relationship with him?”

“It’s a disgrace that information would be let out,” answered Trump. “It’s fake news. It’s phony stuff and it didn’t happen. Sick people put that crap together.” And as far as the hacking, he admits that he believes Russia did it, but also mentioned he thinks the U.S. also gets hacked by other countries.

He also criticized the DNC, saying that their defense against the hacks wasn’t sufficient. “If Donald Trump got the questions before the debate, it would be the biggest story in the history of stories.”

“If Putin likes Donald Trump, I consider that an asset, not a liability,” Trump stated.

Hallie Jackson of NBC, asked about business dealings with Russia and if he will release the tax returns.

“I have no loans or deals with Russia,” said Trump. “Over the weekend, I was offered over $2 billion to do a real estate deal in Dubai. I turned it down, but I didn’t have to. I will have no conflict of interest, even though I could run the Trump Organization and the country, but I don’t want to do that.”

“I’m still under audit,” Trump said. “Anyway, only reporters care about the tax returns. The people don’t.”

A Trump attorney named Sheri Dillon from the firm Morgan, Lewis and Bockius made some remarks regarding the Pres.-elect’s business arrangements and how he is handing over the reins of the Trump Organization to Donald Jr. and Eric Trump. She compared Trump’s business situation to that of Nelson Rockefeller when he became vice president, and remarked that Trump “should not be expected to destroy the company he built.”

Major Garrett from CBS News asked a series of questions: “Based on your tweet from this morning, are we living in Nazi Germany? What is the timeline in terms of your Supreme Court  nominations? Will the U.S. taxpayer be paying for this border wall?”

“Mexico will reimburse us for the wall,” said Trump. “I want to get it started as soon as possible, and the Mexican government has been terrific.”

Trump also stood by “Nazi Germany” tweet, once again going after intelligence agencies for leaking “fake news.”

He later referred to BuzzFeed as “a failing pile of garbage that will suffer the consequences.” He told CNN’s Jim Acosta: “Your organization is terrible, and I am not going to give you a question. You are fake news.”

There you have it, everyone who voted for Trump, pat yourself on the back for electing the most unworthy person in the world to The Office of The President of The United States. And may God have mercy on us all.

Herb Ryan/Custer Free Press

Declassified Intelligence Report On Russian Hacking – You Be The Judge

January 6, 2017
Custer Free Press

Scope and Sourcing

Information available as of 29 December 2016 was used in the preparation of this product.


This report includes an analytic assessment drafted and coordinated among The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and The National Security Agency (NSA), which draws on intelligence information collected and disseminated by those three agencies. It covers the motivation and scope of Moscow’s intentions regarding US elections and Moscow’s use of cyber tools and media campaigns to influence US public opinion. The assessment focuses on activities aimed at the 2016 US presidential election and draws on our understanding of previous Russian influence operations. When we use the term “we” it refers to an assessment by all three agencies.

  • This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment. This document’s conclusions are identical to the highly classified assessment, but this document does not include the full supporting information, including specific intelligence on key elements of the influence campaign. Given the redactions, we made minor edits purely for readability and flow.

We did not make an assessment of the impact that Russian activities had on the outcome of the 2016 election. The US Intelligence Community is charged with monitoring and assessing the intentions, capabilities, and actions of foreign actors; it does not analyze US political processes or US public opinion.

  • New information continues to emerge, providing increased insight into Russian activities.


Many of the key judgments in this assessment rely on a body of reporting from multiple sources that are consistent with our understanding of Russian behavior. Insights into Russian efforts—including specific cyber operations—and Russian views of key US players derive from multiple corroborating sources.

Some of our judgments about Kremlin preferences and intent are drawn from the behavior of Kremlin loyal political figures, state media, and pro-Kremlin social media actors, all of whom the Kremlin either directly uses to convey messages or who are answerable to the Kremlin. The Russian leadership invests significant resources in both foreign and domestic propaganda and places a premium on transmitting what it views as consistent, self-reinforcing narratives regarding its desires and redlines, whether on Ukraine, Syria, or relations with the United States.

Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections

Key Judgments

Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations.

We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. We have high confidence in these judgments.

  • We also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him. All three agencies agree with this judgment. CIA and FBI have high confidence in this judgment; NSA has moderate confidence.
  • Moscow’s approach evolved over the course of the campaign based on Russia’s understanding of the electoral prospects of the two main candidates. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the election, the Russian influence campaign began to focus more on undermining her future presidency.
  • Further information has come to light since Election Day that, when combined with Russian behavior since early November 2016, increases our confidence in our assessments of Russian motivations and goals

Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.” Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on US presidential elections that have used intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin.

  • Russia’s intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 US presidential election, including targets associated with both major US political parties.
  • We assess with high confidence that Russian military intelligence (General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate or GRU) used the Guccifer 2.0 persona and DCLeaks.com to release US victim data obtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets and relayed material to WikiLeaks.
  • Russian intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local electoral boards. DHS assesses that the types of systems Russian actors targeted or compromised were not involved in vote tallying.
  • Russia’s state-run propaganda machine contributed to the influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences. We assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the US presidential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes.

Russia’s Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election

Putin Ordered Campaign To Influence US Election We assess with high confidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election, the consistent goals of which were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the election, the Russian influence campaign then focused on undermining her expected presidency.

  • We also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him. All three agencies agree with this judgment. CIA and FBI have high confidence in this judgment; NSA has moderate confidence.
  • In trying to influence the US election, we assess the Kremlin sought to advance its longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, the promotion of which Putin and other senior Russian leaders view as a threat to Russia and Putin’s regime.
  • Putin publicly pointed to the Panama Papers disclosure and the Olympic doping scandal as US-directed efforts to defame Russia, suggesting he sought to use disclosures to discredit the image of the United States and cast it as hypocritical.
  • Putin most likely wanted to discredit Secretary Clinton because he has publicly blamed her since 2011 for inciting mass protests against his regime in late 2011 and early 2012, and because he holds a grudge for comments he almost certainly saw as disparaging him. We assess Putin, his advisers, and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump over Secretary Clinton.
  • Beginning in June, Putin’s public comments about the US presidential race avoided directly praising President-elect Trump, probably because Kremlin officials thought that any praise from Putin personally would backfire in the United States. Nonetheless, Putin publicly indicated a preference for President-elect Trump’s stated policy to work with Russia, and pro-Kremlin figures spoke highly about what they saw as his Russia-friendly positions on Syria and Ukraine. Putin publicly contrasted the President-elect’s approach to Russia with Secretary Clinton’s “aggressive rhetoric.”
  • Moscow also saw the election of President elect Trump as a way to achieve an international counterterrorism coalition against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). · Putin has had many positive experiences working with Western political leaders whose business interests made them more disposed to deal with Russia, such as former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.

· Putin, Russian officials, and other pro-Kremlin pundits stopped publicly criticizing the US election process as unfair almost immediately This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the after the election because

Moscow probably assessed it would be counterproductive to building positive relations.

We assess the influence campaign aspired to help President-elect Trump’s chances of victory when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to the President-elect. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the presidency the Russian influence campaign focused more on undercutting Secretary Clinton’s legitimacy and crippling her presidency from its start, including by impugning the fairness of the election.

  • Before the election, Russian diplomats had publicly denounced the US electoral process and were prepared to publicly call into question the validity of the results. Pro Kremlin bloggers had prepared a Twitter campaign, #DemocracyRIP, on election night in anticipation of Secretary Clinton’s victory, judging from their social media activity. Russian Campaign Was Multifaceted Moscow’s use of disclosures during the US election was unprecedented, but its influence campaign otherwise followed a longstanding Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.”
  • We assess that influence campaigns are approved at the highest levels of the Russian Government—particularly those that would be politically sensitive.
  • Moscow’s campaign aimed at the US election reflected years of investment in its capabilities, which Moscow has honed in the former Soviet states.
  • By their nature, Russian influence campaigns are multifaceted and designed to be deniable because they use a mix of agents of influence, cutouts, front organizations, and false-flag operations. Moscow demonstrated this during the Ukraine crisis in 2014, when Russia deployed forces and advisers to eastern Ukraine and denied it publicly.

The Kremlin’s campaign aimed at the US election featured disclosures of data obtained through Russian cyber operations; intrusions into US state and local electoral boards; and overt propaganda. Russian intelligence collection both informed and enabled the influence campaign.

Cyber Espionage Against US Political Organizations.

Russia’s intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 US presidential election, including targets associated with both major US political parties. We assess Russian intelligence services collected against the US primary campaigns, think tanks, and lobbying groups they viewed as likely to shape future US policies. In July 2015, Russian intelligence gained access to Democratic National Committee (DNC) networks and maintained that access until at least June 2016.

  • The General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) probablybegan cyber operations aimed at the US election by March 2016. We assess that the GRU operations resulted in the compromise of the personal e-mail accounts of Democratic Party officials and political figures. By May, the GRU had exfiltrated large volumes of data from the DNC.

Public Disclosures of Russian-Collected Data.

We assess with high confidence that the GRU used the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DCLeaks.com, and WikiLeaks to release US victim data obtained in This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets.

  • Guccifer 2.0, who claimed to be an independent Romanian hacker, made multiple contradictory statements and false claims about his likely Russian identity throughout the election. Press reporting suggests more than one person claiming to be Guccifer 2.0 interacted with journalists.
  • Content that we assess was taken from e-mail accounts targeted by the GRU in March 2016 appeared on DCLeaks.com starting in June. We assess with high confidence that the GRU relayed material it acquired from the DNC and senior Democratic officials to WikiLeaks. Moscow most likely chose WikiLeaks because of its selfproclaimed reputation for authenticity. Disclosures through WikiLeaks did not contain any evident forgeries.
  • In early September, Putin said publicly it was important the DNC data was exposed to WikiLeaks, calling the search for the source of the leaks a distraction and denying Russian “state-level” involvement.
  • The Kremlin’s principal international propaganda outlet RT (formerly Russia Today) has actively collaborated with WikiLeaks. RT’s editor-in-chief visited WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London in August 2013, where they discussed renewing his broadcast contract with RT, according to Russian and Western media. Russian media subsequently announced that RT had become “the only Russian media company” to partner with WikiLeaks and had received access to “new leaks of secret information.” RT routinely gives Assange sympathetic coverage and provides him a platform to denounce the United States.

These election-related disclosures reflect a pattern of Russian intelligence using hacked information in targeted influence efforts against targets such as Olympic athletes and other foreign governments. Such efforts have included releasing or altering personal data, defacing websites, or releasing emails.

  • A prominent target since the 2016 Summer Olympics has been the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), with leaks that we assess to have originated with the GRU and that have involved data on US athletes. Russia collected on some Republican-affiliated targets but did not conduct a comparable disclosure campaign.

Russian Cyber Intrusions Into State and Local Electoral Boards.

Russian intelligence accessed elements of multiple state or local electoral boards. Since early 2014, Russian intelligence has researched US electoral processes and related technology and equipment.

  • DHS assesses that the types of systems we observed Russian actors targeting or compromising are not involved in vote tallying.

Russian Propaganda Efforts.

Russia’s state-run propaganda machine—comprised of its domestic media apparatus, outlets targeting global audiences such as RT and Sputnik, and a network of quasi-government trolls—contributed to the influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences. State-owned Russian media made increasingly favorable comments about President elect Trump as the 2016 US general and primary election campaigns progressed while consistently offering negative coverage of Secretary Clinton.

  • Starting in March 2016, Russian Government– linked actors began openly supporting President-elect Trump’s candidacy in media aimed at English-speaking audiences. RT and Sputnik—another government-funded outlet producing pro-Kremlin radio and online content in a variety of languages for international audiences—consistently cast President-elect Trump as the target of unfair coverage from traditional US media outlets that they claimed were subservient to a corrupt political establishment.
  • Russian media hailed President-elect Trump’s victory as a vindication of Putin’s advocacy of global populist movements—the theme of Putin’s annual conference for Western academics in October 2016—and the latest example of Western liberalism’s collapse.
  • Putin’s chief propagandist Dmitriy Kiselev used his flagship weekly newsmagazine program this fall to cast President-elect Trump as an outsider victimized by a corrupt political establishment and faulty democratic election process that aimed to prevent his election because of his desire to work with Moscow.
  • Pro-Kremlin proxy Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, proclaimed just before the election that if President-elect Trump won, Russia would “drink champagne” in anticipation of being able to advance its positions on Syria and Ukraine. RT’s coverage of Secretary Clinton throughout the US presidential campaign was consistently negative and focused on her leaked e-mails and accused her of corruption, poor physical and mental health, and ties to Islamic extremism. Some Russian officials echoed Russian lines for the influence campaign that Secretary Clinton’s election could lead to a war between the United States and Russia.
  • In August, Kremlin-linked political analysts suggested avenging negative Western reports on Putin by airing segments devoted to Secretary Clinton’s alleged health problems.
  • On 6 August, RT published an English language video called “Julian Assange Special: Do WikiLeaks Have the E-mail That’ll Put Clinton in Prison?” and an exclusive interview with Assange entitled “Clinton and ISIS Funded by the Same Money.” RT’s most popular video on Secretary Clinton, “How 100% of the Clintons’ ‘Charity’ Went to…Themselves,” had more than 9 million views on social media platforms. RT’s most popular English language video about the President-elect, called “Trump Will Not Be Permitted To Win,” featured Assange and had 2.2 million views.
  • For more on Russia’s past media efforts— including portraying the 2012 US electoral process as undemocratic—please see Annex A: Russia—Kremlin’s TV Seeks To Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in US. Russia used trolls as well as RT as part of its influence efforts to denigrate Secretary Clinton. This effort amplified stories on scandals about Secretary Clinton and the role of WikiLeaks in the election campaign.
  • The likely financier of the so-called Internet Research Agency of professional trolls located in Saint Petersburg is a close Putin ally with ties to Russian intelligence.
  • A journalist who is a leading expert on the Internet Research Agency claimed that some social media accounts that appear to be tied to Russia’s professional trolls—because they previously were devoted to supporting Russian actions in Ukraine—started to advocate for President-elect Trump as early as December 2015.

Influence Effort Was Boldest Yet in the US Russia’s effort to influence the 2016 US presidential election represented a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations aimed at US elections. We assess the 2016 influence campaign reflected the Kremlin’s recognition of the worldwide effects that mass disclosures of US Government and other private data—such as those conducted by WikiLeaks and others—have achieved in recent years, and their understanding of the value of orchestrating such disclosures to maximize the impact of compromising information.

  • During the Cold War, the Soviet Union used intelligence officers, influence agents, forgeries, and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin, according to a former KGB archivist. Since the Cold War, Russian intelligence efforts related to US elections have primarily focused on foreign intelligence collection. For decades, Russian and Soviet intelligence services have sought to collect insider information from US political parties that could help Russian leaders understand a new US administration’s plans and priorities.
  • The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Directorate S (Illegals) officers arrested in the United States in 2010 reported to Moscow about the 2008 election.
  • In the 1970s, the KGB recruited a Democratic Party activist who reported information about then-presidential hopeful Jimmy Carter’s campaign and foreign policy plans, according to a former KGB archivist.

Election Operation Signals “New Normal” in Russian Influence Efforts

We assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its campaign aimed at the US presidential election to future influence efforts in the United States and worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes. We assess the Russian intelligence services would have seen their election influence campaign as at least a qualified success because of their perceived ability to impact public discussion.

  • Putin’s public views of the disclosures suggest the Kremlin and the intelligence services will continue to consider using cyber-enabled disclosure operations because of their belief that these can accomplish Russian goals relatively easily without significant damage to Russian interests.
  • Russia has sought to influence elections across Europe.

We assess Russian intelligence services will continue to develop capabilities to provide Putin with options to use against the United States, judging from past practice and current efforts. Immediately after Election Day, we assess Russian intelligence began a spearphishing campaign targeting US Government employees and individuals associated with US think tanks and NGOs in national security, defense, and foreign policy fields. This campaign could provide material for future influence efforts as well as foreign intelligence collection on the incoming administration’s goals and plans.

ANNEX A. This annex was originally published on 11 December 2012 by the Open Source Center, now the Open Source Enterprise.

Russia — Kremlin’s TV Seeks To Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in US*

RT America TV, a Kremlin-financed channel operated from within the United States, has substantially expanded its repertoire of programming that highlights criticism of alleged US shortcomings in democracy and civil liberties. The rapid expansion of RT’s operations and budget and recent candid statements by RT’s leadership point to the channel’s importance to the Kremlin as a messaging tool and indicate a Kremlin directed campaign to undermine faith in the US Government and fuel political protest. The Kremlin has committed significant resources to expanding the channel’s reach, particularly its social media footprint. A reliable UK report states that RT recently was the most-watched foreign news channel in the UK. RT America has positioned itself as a domestic US channel and has deliberately sought to obscure any legal ties to the Russian Government.

In the runup to the 2012 US presidential election in November, English-language channel RT America — created and financed by the Russian Government and part of Russian Government-sponsored RT TV (see textbox 1) — intensified its usually critical coverage of the United States. The channel portrayed the US electoral process as undemocratic and featured calls by US protesters for the public to rise up and “take this government back.”

  • RT introduced two new shows — “Breaking the Set” on 4 September and “Truthseeker” on 2 November — both overwhelmingly focused on criticism of US and Western governments as well as the promotion of radical discontent.
  • From August to November 2012, RT ran numerous reports on alleged US election fraud and voting machine vulnerabilities, contending that US election results cannot be trusted and do not reflect the popular will.
  • In an effort to highlight the alleged “lack of democracy” in the United States, RT broadcast, hosted, and advertised thirdparty candidate debates and ran reporting supportive of the political agenda of these candidates. The RT hosts asserted that the US two-party system does not represent the views of at least one-third of the population and is a “sham.”
  • RT aired a documentary about the Occupy Wall Street movement on 1, 2, and 4 November. RT framed the movement as a fight against “the ruling class” and described the current US political system as corrupt and dominated by corporations. RT advertising for the documentary featured Occupy movement calls to “take back” the government. The documentary claimed that the US system cannot be changed democratically, but only through “revolution.” After the 6 November US presidential election, RT aired a documentary called “Cultures of Protest,” about active and often violent political resistance (RT, 1- 10 November).

RT Conducts Strategic Messaging for Russian Government

RT’s criticism of the US election was the latest facet of its broader and longer-standing anti-US messaging likely aimed at undermining viewers’ trust in US democratic procedures and undercutting US criticism of Russia’s political system. RT Editor in Chief Margarita Simonyan recently declared that the United States itself lacks democracy and that it has “no moral right to teach the rest of the world” (Kommersant, 6 November).

  • Simonyan has characterized RT’s coverage of the Occupy Wall Street movement as “information warfare” that is aimed at promoting popular dissatisfaction with the US Government. RT created a Facebook app to connect Occupy Wall Street protesters via social media. In addition, RT featured its own hosts in Occupy rallies (“Minaev Live,” 10 April; RT, 2, 12 June).
  • RT’s reports often characterize the United States as a “surveillance state” and allege widespread infringements of civil liberties, police brutality, and drone use (RT, 24, 28 October, 1-10 November).
  • RT has also focused on criticism of the US economic system, US currency policy, alleged Wall Street greed, and the US national debt. Some of RT’s hosts have compared the United States to Imperial Rome and have predicted that government corruption and “corporate greed” will lead to US financial collapse (RT, 31 October, 4 November).

RT broadcasts support for other Russian interests in areas such as foreign and energy policy. · RT runs anti-fracking programming, highlighting environmental issues and the impacts on public health. This is likely reflective of the Russian Government’s concern about the impact of fracking and US natural gas production on the global energy market and the potential challenges to Gazprom’s profitability (5 October).

  • RT is a leading media voice opposing Western intervention in the Syrian conflict and blaming the West for waging “information wars” against the Syrian Government (RT, 10 October-9 November).
  • In an earlier example of RT’s messaging in support of the Russian Government, during the Georgia-Russia military conflict the channel accused Georgians of killing civilians and organizing a genocide of the Ossetian people. According to Simonyan, when “the Ministry of Defense was at war with Georgia,” RT was “waging an information war against the entire Western world” (Kommersant, 11 July). In recent interviews, RT’s leadership has candidly acknowledged its mission to expand its US audience and to expose it to Kremlin messaging. However, the leadership rejected claims that RT interferes in US domestic affairs.
  • Simonyan claimed in popular arts magazine Afisha on 3 October: “It is important to have a channel that people get used to, and then, when needed, you show them what you need to show. In some sense, not having our own foreign broadcasting is the same as not having a ministry of defense. When there is no war, it looks like we don’t need it. However, when there is a war, it is critical.”
  • According to Simonyan, “the word ‘propaganda’ has a very negative connotation, but indeed, there is not a single international foreign TV channel that is doing something other than promotion of the values of the country that it is broadcasting from.” She added that “when Russia is at war, we are, of course, on Russia’s side” (Afisha, 3 October; Kommersant, 4 July).
  • TV-Novosti director Nikolov said on 4 October to the Association of Cable Television that RT builds on worldwide demand for “an alternative view of the entire world.” Simonyan asserted on 3 October in Afisha that RT’s goal is “to make an alternative channel that shares information unavailable elsewhere” in order to “conquer the audience” and expose it to Russian state messaging (Afisha, 3 October; Kommersant, 4 July).
  • On 26 May, Simonyan tweeted with irony: “Ambassador McFaul hints that our channel is interference with US domestic affairs. And we, sinful souls, were thinking that it is freedom of speech.”

RT Leadership Closely Tied to, Controlled by Kremlin

RT Editor in Chief Margarita Simonyan has close ties to top Russian Government officials, especially Presidential Administration Deputy Chief of Staff Aleksey Gromov, who reportedly manages political TV coverage in Russia and is one of the founders of RT.

  • Simonyan has claimed that Gromov shielded her from other officials and their requests to air certain reports. Russian media consider Simonyan to be Gromov’s protege (Kommersant, 4 July; Dozhd TV, 11 July).
  • Simonyan replaced Gromov on stateowned Channel One’s Board of Directors. Government officials, including Gromov and Putin’s Press Secretary Peskov were involved in creating RT and appointing Simonyan (Afisha, 3 October).
  • According to Simonyan, Gromov oversees political coverage on TV, and he has periodic meetings with media managers where he shares classified information and discusses their coverage plans. Some opposition journalists, including Andrey Loshak, claim that he also ordered media attacks on opposition figures (Kommersant, 11 July). The Kremlin staffs RT and closely supervises RT’s coverage, recruiting people who can convey Russian strategic messaging because of their ideological beliefs.
  • The head of RT’s Arabic-language service, Aydar Aganin, was rotated from the diplomatic service to manage RT’s Arabic-language expansion, suggesting a close relationship between RT and Russia’s foreign policy apparatus. RT’s London Bureau is managed by Darya Pushkova, the daughter of Aleksey Pushkov, the current chair of the Duma Russian Foreign Affairs Committee and a former Gorbachev speechwriter (DXB, 26 March 2009; MK.ru, 13 March 2006).
  • According to Simonyan, the Russian Government sets rating and viewership requirements for RT and, “since RT receives budget from the state, it must complete tasks given by the state.” According to Nikolov, RT news stories are written and edited “to become news” exclusively in RT’s Moscow office (Dozhd TV, 11 July; AKT, 4 October).
  • In her interview with pro-Kremlin journalist Sergey Minaev, Simonyan complimented RT staff in the United States for passionately defending Russian positions on the air and in social media. Simonyan said: “I wish you could see…how these guys, not just on air, but on their own social networks, Twitter, and when giving interviews, how they defend the positions that we stand on!” (“Minaev Live,” 10 April). Simonyan shows RT facilities to then Prime Minister Putin. Simonyan was on Putin’s 2012 presidential election campaign staff in Moscow (Rospress, 22 September 2010, Ria Novosti, 25 October 2012).

RT Focuses on Social Media, Building Audience RT aggressively advertises its social media accounts and has a significant and fast-growing social media footprint. In line with its efforts to present itself as anti-mainstream and to provide viewers alternative news content, RT is making its social media operations a top priority, both to avoid broadcast TV regulations and to expand its overall audience.

  • According to RT management, RT’s website receives at least 500,000 unique viewers every day. Since its inception in 2005, RT videos received more than 800 million views on YouTube (1 million views per day), which is the highest among news outlets (see graphics for comparison with other news channels) (AKT, 4 October).
  • According to Simonyan, the TV audience worldwide is losing trust in traditional TV broadcasts and stations, while the popularity of “alternative channels” like RT or Al Jazeera grows. RT markets itself as an “alternative channel” that is available via the Internet everywhere in the world, and it encourages interaction and social networking (Kommersant, 29 September).
  • According to Simonyan, RT uses social media to expand the reach of its political reporting and uses well-trained people to monitor public opinion in social media commentaries (Kommersant, 29 September).
  • According to Nikolov, RT requires its hosts to have social media accounts, in part because social media allows the distribution of content that would not be allowed on television (Newreporter.org, 11 October).
  • Simonyan claimed in her 3 October interview to independent TV channel Dozhd that Occupy Wall Street coverage gave RT a significant audience boost. The Kremlin spends $190 million a year on the distribution and dissemination of RT programming, focusing on hotels and satellite, terrestrial, and cable broadcasting. The Kremlin is rapidly expanding RT’s availability around the world and giving it a reach comparable to channels such as Al Jazeera English. According to Simonyan, the United Kingdom and the United States are RT’s most successful markets. RT does not, however, publish audience information.
  • According to market research company Nielsen, RT had the most rapid growth (40 percent) among all international news channels in the United States over the past year (2012). Its audience in New York tripled and in Washington DC grew by 60% (Kommersant, 4 July).
  • RT claims that it is surpassing Al Jazeera in viewership in New York and Washington DC (BARB, 20 November; RT, 21 November).
  • RT states on its website that it can reach more than 550 million people worldwide and 85 million people in the United States; however, it does not publicize its actual US audience numbers (RT, 10 December).

Formal Disassociation From Kremlin Facilitates RT US Messaging

RT America formally disassociates itself from the Russian Government by using a Moscow-based autonomous nonprofit organization to finance its US operations. According to RT’s leadership, this structure was set up to avoid the Foreign Agents Registration Act and to facilitate licensing abroad. In addition, RT rebranded itself in 2008 to deemphasize its Russian origin.

  • According to Simonyan, RT America differs from other Russian state institutions in terms of ownership, but not in terms of financing. To disassociate RT from the Russian Government, the federal news agency RIA Novosti established a subsidiary autonomous nonprofit organization, TVNovosti, using the formal independence of this company to establish and finance RT worldwide (Dozhd TV, 11 July).
  • Nikolov claimed that RT is an “autonomous noncommercial entity,” which is “well received by foreign regulators” and “simplifies getting a license.” Simonyan said that RT America is not a “foreign agent” according to US law because it uses a US commercial organization for its broadcasts (AKT, 4 October; Dozhd TV, 11 July).
  • Simonyan observed that RT’s original Russia-centric news reporting did not generate sufficient audience, so RT switched to covering international and US domestic affairs and removed the words “Russia Today” from the logo “to stop scaring away the audience” (Afisha, 18 October; Kommersant, 4 July).
  • RT hires or makes contractual agreements with Westerners with views that fit its agenda and airs them on RT. Simonyan said on the pro-Kremlin show “Minaev Live” on 10 April that RT has enough audience and money to be able to choose its hosts, and it chooses the hosts that “think like us,” “are interested in working in the anti-mainstream,” and defend RT’s beliefs on social media. Some hosts and journalists do not present themselves as associated with RT when interviewing people, and many of them have affiliations to other media and activist organizations in the United States (“Minaev Live,” 10 April).

Editors note: Several pages with graphic and photos were omitted in this report to save time loading.

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